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 A B S T R A C T  
There are two kinds of earnings management: accrual earnings management and
real earnings management. This study aims to assess the effect of earnings man-
agement on earnings persistence and cost of equity on 155 firms listed on the Indo-
nesia Stock Exchange during the 2001-2010 periods. Analysis in this study uses the 
Panel Regression Fixed Effect method. The result shows that accrual and real earn-
ings management do not weaken earnings persistence. Furthermore, it was found
that accrual earnings management has a positive effect on the cost of equity. Con-
versely, earnings management through real activity manipulation has a negative
effect on the cost of equity. These results may indicate that investors are already
aware of a firm’s earnings management behaviors through discretionary accrual, 
but may still not be aware of the negative impact of earnings management through 
real activity manipulation.  
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 A B S T R A K  
Terdapat dua jenis manajemen laba: manajemen laba akrual dan manajemen laba riil.
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menilai efek dari manajemen laba pada persistensi laba 
dan biaya ekuitas pada 155 perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia selama 
periode 2001-2010. Analisis dalam penelitian ini menggunakan metode Panel Regres-
sion Fixed Effect. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa manajemen laba akrual dan riil tidak 
melemahkan persistensi laba. Selanjutnya, ditemukan bahwa manajemen laba akrual
memiliki efek positif pada biaya ekuitas. Sebaliknya, manajemen laba melalui manipu-
lasi aktivitas riil memiliki efek negatif pada biaya ekuitas. Hasil ini mungkin menun-
jukkan bahwa investor sudah menyadari perilaku manajemen laba perusahaan melalui 
discretionary accrual, tapi mungkin masih tidak menyadari dampak negatif dari 
manajemen laba melalui manipulasi aktivitas riil.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of information about earnings of an 
enterprise may provide incentives for management 
to manage its earnings to make the entity looks 
good financially. Managers have a vested interest 
in the selection of accounting policies that are ex-
pected to maximize their utility (opportunistic) or 
provide private information to the users of financial 
statements (efficient). This is called earnings man-
agement (Scott 2009: 403). 
Earnings management can not only be done 
using discretionary accrual, but also by manipulat-
ing real activities (real earnings management). Real 
earnings management not only affects earnings, but 
also operating cash flow (Roychowdhury 2006). 
According to Cohen et al. (2011) the terms ‘manipu-
lation of real activities’, ‘real activity management’, 
and ‘real earnings management’ are interchange-
able. 
In Indonesia, many studies have examined ac-
cruals earnings management. Gumanti (2001) 
found no earnings management during IPO in In-
donesia, while Saiful (2002), Assih et al. (2005), 
Amin (2007), Kusumawardhani & Siregar (2009) 
found contradicting results (i.e. IPO firms engage in 
earnings management). Siregar & Utama (2008) 
show that earnings management is significantly 
higher in firms with high family ownership which 
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are not part of a business group than in other firms. 
Rahmawati et al. (2007) found evidence that earn-
ings management is positively influenced by the 
information asymmetry. 
Studies on real earnings management was ini-
tiated by Roychowdhury (2006). Since Roychowd-
hury, there have been several studies in Indonesia 
examining this type of earnings management. Sari 
(2008), Oktorina (2008), Sahabu (2009) found that 
firms engage in real earnings management, 
whereas Annisaa (2007) did not find evidence of 
the existence of real activity manipulation. 
The existence of earnings management will af-
fect the earnings quality. One indicator of earnings 
quality is earnings persistence (Dechow et al. 2010). 
It is interesting to examine the effect of earnings 
management on the persistence of earnings to de-
termine whether earnings management will 
strengthen or weaken the earnings persistence. 
Furthermore, we were also interested in exam-
ining the consequences of earnings management on 
investors. Francis et al. (2004) and Utami (2005) 
provide empirical evidence that earnings manage-
ment has a positive effect on cost of equity capital. 
This means that investors respond to the phenome-
non of earnings management by raising the ex-
pected rate of return of firms engaging in earnings 
management. However, the effect of real earnings 
management on cost of equity capital has not been 
investigated yet. There are a limited number of 
studies that examine both accrual earnings man-
agement and real earnings management on the 
earnings persistence and also its effect on the cost 
of equity capital. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESES 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) state that agency relation-
ship arises when one or more individuals (princi-
pals) hire another individual (agent) and then dele-
gate authority to the agent to make decisions on 
behalf of the principal. As an agent, the manager is 
morally responsible for optimizing the benefit to 
the owner (principal), but on the other hand, man-
agers also have an interest to maximize their wel-
fare, so it is most likely that the agent does not al-
ways act in the best interests of the principal. 
If associated with the agency relationship 
characteristics, it is certain that the managers have 
better, more, and faster information than external 
parties, such as investors and creditors. This infor-
mation asymmetry provides incentives to man-
agement to undertake earnings management in 
order to maximize their own welfare. 
There are two types of earnings management: 
accrual earnings management and real earnings 
management. Some studies that use discretionary 
accruals, among others, are Healy (1985); DeAngelo 
(1988); Jones (1991); Dechow et al. (1995); DeAngelo 
et al. (1994); Subramanyam (1996); Kasznik (1999); 
Gul et al. (2000); Bartov et al. (2000); Dechow et al. 
(2002), and Kothari et al. (2005). While studies that 
use real activity were carried out by Roychowd-
hury (2006), Cohen et al. (2008), and Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010). 
In Indonesia, study on earnings management 
provides mixed evidence, there is no earnings 
management through discretionary accruals (Gu-
manti 2001) and there is earnings management 
through discretionary accruals (Utami 2005; Amin 
2007; Kusumawardhani & Siregar 2010). 
The results on real earnings management activ-
ity studies are also mixed. Sari (2008) finds evi-
dence of real earnings management through sales 
manipulation, overproduction, and reducing dis-
cretionary expenses. Oktorina (2008) finds evidence 
of manipulations of abnormal CFO. Whereas Anni-
saa (2007) does not find evidence of earnings man-
agement through real activities manipulation. 
According to Penman and Zhang (2002), good 
earnings quality can be used as an indicator of fu-
ture earnings. They argue that high earnings qual-
ity will persist in the future. Thus, if the accounting 
procedure produces unsustainable earnings, the 
earnings are considered poor quality. Therefore, we 
aim to determine whether earnings management 
affects earnings persistence. 
Gul et al. (2000) found a negative effect of earn-
ings management through discretionary accruals 
for earnings persistence. Zhang (2006) also found 
that real earnings management through abnormal 
CFO lowers the persistence of earnings. This find-
ing supports Mulford and Comiskey (2005), who 
suggest that the persistence of CFO and earnings 
will be reduced if CFO and earnings are related to 
an abnormal CFO. We expect that earnings man-
agement (accruals and real activities) has a negative 
impact on earnings persistence: 
H1a: Accrual earnings management has a negative 
effect on earnings persistence 
H1b: Real earnings management through abnormal 
CFO has a negative effect on earnings persistence 
H1c: Real earnings management through abnormal 
production costs has a negative effect on earnings 
persistence 
H1d: Real earnings management through abnormal 
discretionary costs has a negative effect on earnings 
persistence 
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Dechow et al. (1996) examined the causes and 
consequences of earnings manipulation. One of the 
aims was to determine the extent of earnings ma-
nipulation impact on the cost of capital. From the 
results of the comparative analysis between firms 
receiving sanctions from the SEC for alleged ma-
nipulation of earnings and control firms, they con-
cluded that the cost of capital of SEC sanctioned 
firms is significantly higher compared to control 
firms. When a firm is proven to manipulate earn-
ings, investors consider the firm as high risk be-
cause the reported performance does not corre-
spond to the actual performance. Therefore, inves-
tors increase their expected rate of return (cost of 
equity capital) in those firms. 
Stolowy & Breton (2000) conducted a literature 
study on earnings manipulation, which included 
earnings management, income smoothing, big bath 
accounting, and creative accounting. Stolowy & 
Breton (2000) explains that earnings manipulations 
are made solely based on management's desire to 
influence investors' perception of risk of the com-
pany. A higher level of earnings management indi-
cates a higher risk of stock returns and conse-
quently investors will raise the cost of equity capi-
tal. Petroni et al. (2000) and Francis et al. (2004) also 
found that the accrual earnings management has a 
positive effect on cost of equity capital. Utami 
(2005) found consistent evidence in Indonesia. 
H2a : Accrual earnings management has a positive 
effect on cost of equity. 
We did not find any study that examined the 
effect of real earnings management on the cost of 
equity capital. Following the same argument with 
accruals earnings management, we expect that 
earnings management through real activities ma-
nipulation will increase the cost of equity capital. 
H2b : Real earnings management through abnor-
mal CFO has a positive effect on cost of equity. 
H2c : Real earnings management through abnormal 
production cost has a positive effect on cost of eq-
uity. 
H2d : Real earnings management through abnor-
mal discretionary cost has a positive effect on cost 
of equity. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
In this study, to test hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d 
persistence models were developed from Hanlon, 
Michelle (2005) and Atwood et al. (2010) by adding 
the variable of real activity management developed 
by Roychowdhury (2006). 
NIBEIit+1 = α + β1 NIBEIit + β2 DAC1it + β3 DAC1 × 
NIBEIit + β4 Abn_CFOit +β5 Abn_CFOit × NIBEIit + β6 
Abn_Prodit +β7 Abn_Prodit × NIBEIit + β8 Abn_Discit 
+β9 Abn_Discit × NIBEIit  (1) 
NIBEIit+1 = Net income before extraordinary item 
for firm i in year t+1 
NIBEIit = Net income before extraordinary item for 
firm i in year t 
DAC1it   = Discretionary Accrual for firm i in year t 
Kothari et al. (2005) 
 Abn_CFOit  = Abnormal CFO for firm i in year t 
 Abn_Prodit  = Abnormal production costs for firm i 
in year t 
 Abn_Discit  = Abnormal discretionary costs for firm 
i in year t 
We predicted that the existence of accruals 
earnings management weakens persistence of cur-
rent earnings on next year earnings (β3 < 0). Real 
earnings management through sales manipulation 
occurs when abnormal CFO (Abn_CFO) is nega-
tive, therefore if abnormal CFO weakens earnings 
persistence then β5 > 0. Real earnings management 
through overproduction occurs when abnormal 
production costs (Abn_Prod) are positive. The exis-
tence of abnormal production costs weakens earn-
ings persistence if β7 < 0. Firms are considered to be 
engaging in abnormal discretionary expenses when 
Abn_Disc is negative. Thus, real earnings manage-
ment through discretionary cost reduction 
(Abn_Disc) weakens earnings persistence (β9 > 0). 
The research model to test hypotheses 2a, 2b, 
2c and 2d was developed from Francis et al. (2004, 
2005) and Utami (2005) by adding the variable of 
real earnings management by Roychowdhury 
(2006): 
COEit = α + β1 ABSDAC1it + β2 Abn_CFOit + β3 
Abn_Prodit + β4 Abn_Discit +β5 Abn_Sizeit + β6 
Abn_BMit +β7 Betait + εit  (2) 
COEit = Cost of equity calculated using CAPM 
ABSDAC1it = Absolute value from discretionary 
accrual based on Kothari et al. (2005) 
Abn_CFOit = Abnormal CFO 
Abn_Prodit Abnormal production cost 
Abn_Discit = Abnormal discretionary accrual 
Sizeit = market capitalization 
BMit = book-to-market ratio 
Betait = beta 
Based on a previous study (Siregar 2005; San-
jaya 2008) this study uses the absolute value of dis-
cretionary accruals as we focused on the magnitude 
of discretionary accruals not the direction (positive 
or negative). 
Earnings management through discretionary 
accruals is expected to have a positive effect on cost 
of equity capital (β1 > 0). Real earnings manage-
ment through the manipulation of sales (Abn_CFO) 
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has a positive effect on cost of equity capital (β2 < 
0), real earnings management through overproduc-
tion (Abn_Prod) has a positive effect on the cost of 
equity capital (β3 > 0), and real earnings manage-
ment through discretionary cost reduction 
(Abn_Disc) has a positive effect on cost of equity 
capital (β4 < 0). 
 
Earnings Persistence 
The persistence of profits is derived from the re-
gression coefficients of net income before extraor-
dinary items in year t (NIBEt) on net income before 
extraordinary items in year t+1 (NIBEt+1), where β1 
indicates the persistence of earnings. 
NIBEt+1 = α + β1 NIBEt + εt (3) 
 
Cost of Equity Capital 
Cost of equity capital is measured by using the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The CAPM 
measurement formula is as follow: 
COEt = Rf + β1 Rp (4) 
COEt = Cost of equity 
Rf = Risk free rate 
β1 = Beta 
Rp = Country risk premium 
The cost of equity measurement in this study 
uses data already available from the Bloomberg 
database in Bapepam-LK. 
 
Accrual Earnings Management 
Accrual earnings management is measured using 
discretionary accruals. Discretionary accrual used 
in this study employs Kothari et al. (2005). 
DACit = 
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(5) 
DACit = Discretionary accrual for firm i in year t 
TAit-1 = Total assets for firm i in year t-1 
ΔREVit = Net sales for firm i for year t – net sales for 
firm i for year t-1 
ΔRECit  = Receivable for firm i for year t – receivable 
for firm i for year t-1 
PPEit = Plant, property and equipment for firm i in 
year t 
ROAit = Return on asset for firm i in year t 
 
Real Earnings Management 
Abnormal CFO 
Abnormal CFO in this study was measured by es-
timating the value of sales manipulation developed 
by Roychowdury (2006): 
 
Abn_CFOit = 
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CFO = Cash flow operations for firm i in year t 
scaled by total assets in year t-1 
1−tt
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S = Sales for firm i for year t scaled by total as-
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S = Sales for firm i year t minus sales in year t-1 
scaled by total assets for year t-1. 
 
Abnormal Production 
In the same way, the measurement of abnormal 
production costs was also conducted using for-
mula: 
Abn_Prodit =
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1−tt
it
A
PROD = Production costs for firm i in year t scaled 
by total assets in year t-1, where PRODt = COGSt + 
ΔINVt 
1−tt
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S = Sales for firm i in year t scaled by total assets 
in year t-1 
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S =  Changes in sales for firm i in year t-1 scaled 
by total assets in year t-1 
 
Abnormal Discretionary Expenses 
The final variables to be measured are the abnormal 
discretionary expenses: 
Abn_Discit = 
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scaled by total assets in year t-1 
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α = Intercepts scaled by total assets for firm i 
in year t-1 
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A
S = Sales for firm i in year t scaled by total assets 
in year t-1 
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The control variables in this study are firm 
size, book-to-market ratio, and beta. Firm size in 
this study is measured using market capitalization 
(Francis et al. 2004). Book-to-market ratio is con-
verted into logarithmic form, following Francis et 
al. (2004). Beta is obtained from the Bloomberg da-
tabase available at Bapepam-LK. 
To test the sensitivity of the results of this 
study, we change the accrual earnings management 
measurement using Kasznik (1999): 
DACit = 
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ΔCFO = change in operating cash flow for firm i in 
year t. 
Furthermore, real earnings management 
through abnormal CFO, abnormal production 
costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses, are 
divided into 2 groups, RM_1 and RM_2 (Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010). According to Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) the grouping is made to match the direction 
of the real activities manipulation measurement 
magnitude. RM_1 is the sum of abnormal discre-
tionary expenses multiplied by -1 and abnormal 
production costs. RM_2 is the sum of abnormal 
CFO multiplied by -1 and abnormal discretionary 
costs multiplied by -1. The more positive the values 
of RM_1 and RM_2, the stronger the indication that 
the company is performing real earnings manage-
ment. Regression tests are conducted against both 
of these measurements to see whether there are 
differences in the conclusions of the main models, 
both the persistence model and the model of equity 
capital cost. 
Petroni et al. (2000) correlate discretionary ac-
cruals to the cost of equity capital. Their study uses 
beta as the measurement of cost of equity capital. 
Therefore a sensitivity analysis is also conducted by 
replacing cost of equity using CAPM with beta. The 
final sensitivity test is conducted by using a calcula-
tion cost of equity capital by Utami (2005), where 
the formula of cost of equity capital is as follows: 
r = (Bt + Et+1 – Pt) /Pt (10) 
r = cost of equity capital 
Bt = book value per share on period t Et+1 = earnings per share on period t+1 
Pt = share market value on period t 
 
Sample Selection 
Sample selection criteria are as follows: 
1. Financial industry firms are excluded because 
they are highly regulated so they could have 
different earnings management behaviors than 
other industries. 
2. Firms do not have negative equity. 
3. Firms have complete data. 
Outliers are treated by winsorisation using 1% 
as the upper limit and lower limit. The result of 
sample selection is shown in Table 1. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Statistics 
Our samples are collected from eight industry sec-
tors consisting of the Agricultural Industry (3 com-
panies); Basic Industry and Chemicals (32 compa-
nies); Consumer Goods Industry (24 companies); 
Infrastructure, Utilities & Transportation (11 com-
panies); Mining Industry (9 companies); Miscelane-
ous Industry (21 companies); Property, Real Estate, 
Construction and Building (17 companies); Trade, 
Services and Investments (38 companies). 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of all 
variables used in this study. Discretionary accruals 
in this study used two measurement models, 
namely DAC1 based on Kothari et al. (2005) and 
DAC2 based on Kasznik (1999). Mean DAC1 and 
DAC2, both show a positive number, which means 
that, on average, companies engage in income in-
creasing earnings management. 
According to Roychowdhury (2006) real earn-
ings management occurs through abnormal CFO 
(Abn_CFO) if the abnormal CFO is a negative 
number. On average the Abn_CFO value indicates 
a positive number 0.01744, which means, on aver-
age, sample firms do not undertake real earnings 
management via abnormal CFO. 
The average abnormal production costs 
(Abn_Prod) is -0.07404. Real earnings management 
occurs through the manipulation of the production 
cost if the abnormal production costs are positive 
(Roychowdury 2006). It can be seen that average 
real earnings management does not occur through 
abnormal production costs. 
Table 1 
Sample Selection 
Criteria  N 
Firms listed during year 1999-2010 452 
Financial institutions (75) 
Incomplete data (185) 
Negative equity (37) 
Number of firms 155 
Years 10 
Total firm-years 1,550 
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The average abnormal discretionary cost  
(Abn_Disc) across the sample of firms is -1.20318. 
According to Roychowdury (2006), Cohen et al. 
(2008) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), the compa-
nies perform earnings management through discre-
tionary cost reduction if abnormal discretionary is a 
negative number. From the firm data studied, sam-
ple firms engage in real earnings management 
through discretionary abnormal. 
Table 3 presents the correlations for all vari-
ables in the persistence model. DAC1 and DAC2 
are negatively related to Abn_CFO. This correlation 
is consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010), 
where a company conducts accrual earnings man-
agement and real earnings management concur-
rently; and overproduction strategy has a positive 
effect on discretionary accruals while at the same 
time having a negative effect on abnormal CFO. As 
production levels increase, the fixed overhead costs 
are spread over more units, lowering the fixed cost 
per unit. As long as the reduction of fixed cost per 
unit is not surpassed by the increase in marginal 
cost per unit, the total cost per unit will decrease. 
This has implications for the lower COGS, and the 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Variables  Mean   Median   Maximum   Minimum   Std. Dev.  
 NIBEI  0.04832 0.03478 0.37077 -0.21744 0.08583 
 CFO  0.06921 0.05701 0.41840 -0.25157 0.11316 
 NDAC1  -0.01885 -0.02050 0.27063 -0.26225 0.08052 
 NDAC2  -0.02147 -0.02389 0.47760 -0.34363 0.11271 
 DAC1  0.00089 -0.00184 0.40125 -0.30883 0.11204 
 DAC2  0.00628 0.00384 0.29020 -0.27668 0.09077 
 COE  8.96972 7.02555 19.97830 -1.95080 4.51206 
 ABSDAC1  0.08046 0.05531 0.44321 0.00064 0.08294 
 ABSDAC2  0.06750 0.04719 0.38790 0.00052 0.06875 
 ABN_CFO  0.01744 0.01314 0.44941 -0.32910 0.12519 
 ABN_PROD  -0.07404 -0.01026 0.89363 -1.20321 0.33305 
 ABN_DISC  -1.20318 -0.04346 2.28348 -18.98921 3.31328 
 BETA  0.48240 0.44235 1.73180 -1.06340 0.39723 
 SIZE (Rp millions) 3,412,876  319,230 76,963,520   9,880   10,728,919  
 BM  1.34382 0.96398 7.25725 0.00004 1.37125 
NIBEI = Net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets; CFO = Cash Flows from Operating; NDAC1 = normal 
discretionary accrual Kothari et al. model (2005); NDAC2 = normal discretionary accrual Kasznik model (1999); DAC1 = 
discretionary accrual Kothrari model (2005); DAC2 = discretionary accrual Kasznik model (1999); COE= cost of equity; ABSDAC1 = 
absolute value of accrual discretionary Kothari et al. model (2005); ABSDAC2 = absolute value of accrual discretionary Kasznik 
model (1999); Abn_CFO = abnormal cash from operating activities; Abn_Prod = abnormal production cost; Abn_Disc = abnormal 
discretionary cost; Beta = non-systematic risk to firm; SIZE. = market capitalization in million rupiah; BM = Book to market ratio 
before being transformed into logarithmic scale (LogBM) 
 
Table 3 
Correlation – Persistence Model 
 NIBEI CFO NDAC1 NDAC2 DAC1 DAC2 Abn_ CFO Abn_Prod Abn_ Disc 
NIBEI 1                 
CFO .530*** 1               
NDAC1 .264*** -.119*** 1             
NDAC2 .055** -.463*** .495*** 1           
DAC1 .015 -.614*** -.316*** .281*** 1         
DAC2 .189*** -.301*** -.082*** -.293*** .598*** 1       
ABN_CFO .364*** .781*** .025 -.327*** -.628*** -.336*** 1     
ABN_PROD -.142*** -.298*** -.070*** .067*** .285*** .204*** -.335*** 1   
ABN_DISC -.009 .049 .064** .064** -.111*** -.156*** .047 -.043 1 
*** significant at α = 1% ** significant at α = 5%. 
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company reports better operating margins. This 
manipulation has a positive effect on accrual earn-
ings management that aims to raise income for the 
period. In contrast, when the level of production 
increases, the company raises the cost of produc-
tion and storage of the excessive products that are 
not recovered in the same period of the sale time. 
As a result, CFOs are lower than normal sales rate, 
thus giving a negative effect on abnormal CFO. 
Consistent with the explanation above, the correla-
tion between discretionary accruals with abnormal 
production costs is significantly positive, where the 
correlation between the abnormal production costs 
with abnormal CFO is significantly negative. 
Furthermore, the correlation between abnor-
mal production costs and abnormal discretionary 
costs is significantly negative. This implies that 
managers undertake activities that produce abnor-
mally high production costs while also reducing 
discretionary costs, as the overall goal of the man-
ager is to report a profit as high as possible in the 
period. 
The correlation for variables in cost of equity 
model is presented in Table 4. Accrual earnings 
management (ABSDAC1 and ABSDAC2) are sig-
nificantly positively associated with cost of equity 
capital (COE). While the correlation of real earnings 
management (Abn_CFO, Abn_Prod, and 
Abn_Disc) and cost of equity indicates the opposite 
direction towards the cost of equity capital. 
 
Hypotheses Testing 
From Table 5 we found evidence of earnings man-
agement through discretionary accruals. This find-
ing corroborates with a previous study (Saiful 2002; 
Assih et al. 2005; Amin 2007), which states that 
public firms engage in earnings management. 
Roychowdury (2006) states that real earnings 
management through sales manipulation occurs if 
the abnormal CFO was negative. Abnormal CFO 
does not occur because it shows the average is 
above 0. Earnings management through overpro-
duction occurs if the abnormal production cost is 
positive. The average abnormal production cost is -
0.07404. This indicates that not all companies per-
form real earnings management via abnormal pro-
duction costs. The results of this study are consis-
tent with Annisaa (2007). 
Real earnings management through a reduc-
tion in discretionary costs occurs if an abnormal 
discretionary cost is negative. We found evidence 
of real earnings management occurring through 
Table 4 
Correlation – Cost of Equity Model 
  COE ABS DAC1 ABS DAC2 Abn_CFO Abn_Prod Abn_Disc BETA SIZE LogBM 
COE 1         
ABS DAC1 .120*** 1        
ABS DAC2 .099*** .504*** 1       
Abn_CFO .062** -.009 -.039 1      
Abn_Prod -.015 .004 .000 -.335*** 1     
Abn_Disc .070*** -.065** -.078*** .047 -.043 1    
BETA .761*** .073*** .028 .050* -.014 .064** 1   
SIZE .199*** .015 -.062** .244*** -.214*** .101*** .197*** 1  
LogBM -.010 .045 .031 -.107*** .125*** .091*** -.025 -.417*** 1 
*** significant at α = 1% ** significant at α = 5%. 
 
Table 5 
Accrual and Real Earnings Management 
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Prob. 
ABSDAC1 0.080457 0.082943 0.0000*** 
ABSDAC2 0.067502 0.068746 0.0000*** 
Abn_CFO 0.017442 0.125185 0.0000*** 
Abn_Prod -0.07404 0.333054 0.0000*** 
Abn_Disc -1.20318 3.313281 0.0000*** 
ABSDAC1 = absolute value of discretionary accrual Kothari et al. model (2005); ABSDAC2 = absolute value of discretionary accrual 
Kasznik model (1999); DAC = discretionary accrual Kothari et al. model (2005); DAC2 = discretionary accrual Kasznik model (1999); 
Abn_CFO = abnormal CFO; Abn_Prod = abnormal production cost; Abn_Disc = abnormal discretionary cost 
***significant at 1% **significant at 5% *significant at 10% 
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abnormal discretionary spending. This finding is 
consistent with Sari (2008). 
Before we examine the effect of earnings man-
agement on earnings persistence, earnings compo-
nents persistence is examined, as performed by Xie 
(2001), to observe the persistence of the CFO, 
NDAC and DAC. 
From the regression results in Table 6, current 
earnings are persistent to future earnings. Panel A 
provides evidence that the three components of 
earnings are persistent; the CFO is more persistent 
than DAC and NDAC, whereas DAC is more per-
sistent than the NDAC. 
Next, to test hypothesis 1a, we can see in Panel 
F that DAC1*NIBEIt is not significant, so hypothe-
sis 1a is rejected. Thus, earnings management 
through discretionary accruals has not been proven 
to weaken the persistence of this year’s earnings to 
next year’s earnings. This could be due to efficient 
earnings management, or company management 
attempting to maintain positive earnings by consis-
tently performing accruals earnings management 
Table 6 
Regression Result – Persistence Model 
NIBEIit+1 = α + β1 NIBEIit + β2 EMit + β3 EMit × NIBEIit + εit 
  Prediction Coefficient t stat Prob.   Adj. R2 F-stat Sig. 
NIBEIit + 0.3158 6.4306 0.0000 *** 0.6076 14.925 *** 
Panel A         
CFOit + 0.30516 8.2956 0.0000 *** 0.6023 14.449 *** 
NDAC1it + 0.17151 4.1924 0.0000 ***    
DAC1it +/- 0.18055 5.2137 0.0000 ***    
Panel B         
NIBEIit + 0.3292 6.8400 0.0000 *** 0.6113 14.966 *** 
DAC1it +/- -0.0499 -2.2203 0.0266 *    
DAC1it*NIBEIit - -0.0782 -0.3313 0.3702     
Panel C         
NIBEIit + 0.2850 6.2133 0.000 *** 0.6162 15.260 *** 
ABN_CFOit +/- 0.0598 3.2967 0.000 ***   
ABN_CFOit*NIBEIit + 0.2302 1.1116 0.133     
Panel D         
NIBEIit + 0.32216 5.9891 0.0000 *** 0.6077 14.755 *** 
ABN_PRODit +/- -0.01567 -1.8563 0.0636 *   
ABN_PRODit*NIBEIit - 0.06174 0.8112 0.2087     
Panel E         
NIBEIit + 0.29154 5.8915 0.000 *** 0.6088 14.8208 *** 
ABN_DISCit +/- 0.00052 0.3463 0.7291     
ABN_DISCit*NIBEIit + -0.01481 -1.2848 0.0995 *    
Panel F         
NIBEIit + 0.28233 5.5238 0.000 *** 0.6169 14.7717 *** 
DAC1it +/- -0.00699 -0.3849 0.700     
DAC1it*NIBEIit - -0.04849 -0.2118 0.4161     
ABN_CFOit +/- 0.04909 2.5153 0.012 **   
ABN_CFOit*NIBEIit + 0.29027 1.12156 0.1311     
ABN_PRODit +/- -0.01166 -1.0984 0.1361     
ABN_PRODit*NIBEIit - 0.13825 1.5059 0.0661 *    
ABN_DISCit +/- 0.00037 0.2446 0.8068     
ABN_DISCit*NIBEIit + -0.01176 -0.9541 0.1701     
NIBEI = net income before extraordinary item; CFO = cash flows from operation; NDAC1 = normal discretionary accrual Kothari 
model (2005); DAC1 = discretionary accrual Kothari model (2005); Abn_CFO = abnormal CFO; Abn_Prod = abnormal production cost; 
Abn_Disc = abnormal discretionary cost. 
***siginicant at 1% **significant at 5%*significant at 10%. 
 
Journal of Economics, Business, and Accountancy Ventura Vol. 17, No. 2, August 2014, pages 269 – 280 
277 
each year, so the presence of earnings management 
does not seem to weaken earnings persistence. An 
alternative explanation for this result is that income 
accrual earnings management reversals may occur 
over longer periods (e.g. in year t +2 or t +3), rather 
than in year t +1. 
Examination of the persistence model was also 
conducted on real earnings management: abnormal 
CFO, abnormal production costs, and abnormal 
discretionary costs. From regression results in 
Panel F, we can see that Abn_CFO* NIBEIt is posi-
tive and not significant, so hypothesis 1b is rejected. 
When companies manipulate sales, earnings in-
crease. It is possible that this real earnings man-
agement behavior leads to the apparent of real 
earnings management and does not weaken the 
persistence of this year’s earnings to next year’s 
earnings, but instead reinforces it, albeit temporar-
ily. 
Results from abnormal production costs 
(Abn_PROD*NIBEIt) shows significant positive 
effect on future earnings, which is inconsistent with 
our prediction, so it can be concluded that hypothe-
sis 1c is rejected. This finding may be due to the 
company performing efficient earnings manage-
ment, otherwise the impact of these new earnings 
management would appear in year t+2 or t+3. An-
other possible explanation may be that the com-
pany's management attempts to maintain positive 
earnings, so they perform real earnings manage-
ment through overproduction in every year, there-
fore the presence of earnings management appears 
to strengthen earnings persistence. 
Regression results show Abn_Disc*NIBEIt is 
insignificant. Consistent with results of accrual 
earnings management and two other measures of 
real earnings management, discretionary cost re-
duction do not weaken earnings persistence. 
From the regression analysis in Table 7 we can 
see that ABSDAC1 has a positive and significant 
effect on the cost of equity capital, so hypothesis 2a 
can not be rejected. This is consistent with Utami 
(2005) and Francis et al. (2004). Previous studies 
have shown that investors will increase the ex-
pected rate of return of firms that perform earnings 
management through discretionary accruals. The 
significance of the effect of discretionary accruals 
on cost of equity capital indicates that the market is 
aware that firms engage in accrual earnings man-
agement, and hence demand higher expected re-
turns (e.g. higher cost of equity capital). 
The effect of an abnormal CFO on the cost of 
equity capital is positive and significant, contrary to 
our prediction and thus hypothesis 2b is rejected. 
Real earnings management via abnormal produc-
tion costs and through discretionary cost reduction 
also does not have a significant effect on cost of 
equity capital. Thus hypotheses 2c and 2d are re-
jected. The results of the regression analysis on real 
earnings management were not found to signifi-
cantly affect the cost of equity capital. It is possible 
that investors are not yet aware of the negative im-
pact of real earnings management. They may per-
ceive firms engaging in real earnings management 
as having better earnings performance. 
Beta significantly has positive effect on the cost 
of equity capital. This result implies that the inves-
tors strongly believe that the greater the value of 
Table 7 
Regression Result – Cost of Equity Model 
COEit = α + β1 ABSDAC1it + β2 Abn_CFOit + β3 Abn_Prodit + β4 Abn_Discit + β5 Sizeit + β6 BMit + β7 Betait + εit 
Variable Prediction Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  Sig. 
C None -16.707 1.4261 0.0018 *** 
ABSDAC1 + 3.0042 1.8902 0.0771 * 
ABN_CFO - 1.4935 0.1127 0.0029 *** 
ABN_PROD + 0.1267 1.0309 0.4551  
ABN_DISC - 0.1123 8.7009 0.1513  
BETA + 8.3304 3.9573 0.0000 *** 
SIZE - 4.0965 3.9573 0.0000 *** 
LOGBM + 4.0629 2.6334 0.0042 *** 
F-statistic  16.253    
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000    
Adjusted R2  0.6132    
COE= cost of equity; ABSDAC1 = absolute value of discretionary accrual Kothari model (2005); ABN_CFO = abnormal CFO; 
ABN_PROD = abnormal production cost; ABN_DISC = abnormal discretionary cost; BETA = nonsystematic risk to firm; SIZE = 
firm size using logarithm of market capitalization; LOGBM = logarithm of book to market equity ratio. 
***siginicant at 1% **significant at 5% *significant at 10%. 
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beta for the company, the higher the risk of the 
company, so they impose a high level of return on 
the company. This result is consistent with Francis 
et al. (2004). Size has a positive and significant im-
pact on the cost of equity capital. This result is not 
consistent with previous studies. It is possible that 
investors consider the company even more subject 
to high interests, and that could affect the com-
pany's performance. Book-to-market ratio has a 
positive effect on the cost of equity capital. This 
result is consistent with Francis et al. (2004). 
To test the sensitivity of the model, regression 
analysis is done by replacing DAC1 and ABSDAC1 
variables using the model from Kothari et al. (2005) 
with variables DAC2 and ABSDAC2 using the 
model from Kasznik (1999). Sensitivity test results 
(untabulated) indicate CFO is consistently more 
persistent than discretionary accruals and discre-
tionary accruals are more persistent than non-
discretionary accruals. Earnings management 
through discretionary accruals also consistently do 
not weaken earnings persistence. Real earnings 
management via abnormal production costs and 
abnormal discretionary costs are also not proven to 
weaken the persistence of earnings. However, there 
is a difference in abnormal CFO real earnings man-
agement; using the model from Kasznik (1999) ab-
normal CFO earnings management significantly 
weakens the persistence of earnings. This difference 
might be due to the fact that the model from 
Kasznik (1999) uses CFO in its independent vari-
ables, so the impact of real earnings management 
via abnormal CFO is more significant when using 
the model from Kasznik (1999) compared to the 
model from Kothari et al. (2005). 
A sensitivity test for cost of equity capital us-
ing the variable ABSDAC2 as the measurement in 
Kasznik’s (1999) model, it was shown to provide 
similar results to the results of the model tests, 
namely earnings management through discretion-
ary accruals having a positive effect on the cost of 
equity capital, while real earnings management 
negatively affecting the cost of equity capital. (A 
test also conducted using dummy variables to con-
trol the crisis year of 2008 and 2009, the test results 
also show that discretionary accruals is positively 
related to cost of equity capital.) 
Furthermore, measurements were also made 
on real earnings management into 2 measurements 
RM_1 and RM_2, where RM_1 is the sum of the 
abnormal discretionary values multiplied by -1 and 
abnormal production costs. RM_2 is the sum of the 
abnormal discretionary cost multiplied by -1 and 
abnormal CFO multiplied by -1 (Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010). Using variables RM_1 and RM_2 
(untabulated) still provides similar results to the 
main results for the persistence model. The effect of 
absolute discretionary accruals remains signifi-
cantly positive on the cost of equity capital, while 
RM_1 and RM_2 have no significant effect on the 
cost of equity capital. 
The final sensitivity tests are by replacing the 
measurement of the cost of equity capital using the 
CAPM calculation with beta and the measurement 
of the cost of equity model based on Utami (2005). 
Both test results are consistent with the main re-
sults, whereby the accrual earnings management 
has a positive effect on the cost of equity capital. 
Whereas real earnings management has a negative 
effect on cost of equity capital. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION AND LIMITATIONS 
This study aims to determine the effect of earnings 
management, either through discretionary accruals 
and real activity, or through earnings persistence 
and cost of equity capital. We fond that firms listed 
on the IDX engage in accrual earnings management 
and real earnings management through discretion-
ary cost reduction (Abn_Disc). Earnings manage-
ment (accrual earnings management and earnings 
management through real activities manipulation) 
is not proven to weaken the persistence of current 
year earnings to next year earnings. The results of 
this study indicate that earnings management 
might be in the form of efficient contracting, or 
firms repeatedly engaging in earnings manage-
ment, otherwise a negative impact of earnings 
management could occur over a longer period (t+2 
or t+3). Earnings management through discretion-
ary accruals has a significant positive effect on the 
cost of equity capital, which is consistent with pre-
vious studies (Utami 2005; Francis et al. 2004). This 
empirical evidence indicates that investors respond 
to accrual earnings management behavior by in-
creasing the cost of equity capital on investments 
that they have in the company. On the contrary, 
investors have yet to capture earnings management 
through real activities manipulation. This could be 
due to a) investors have not noticed the negative 
effects of the manipulation of real activities, or b) 
investors were ‘fooled’ by real activities manipula-
tion 
This study has several limitations. There is a 
possibility that our discretionary accruals model 
can not accurately separate the components of dis-
cretionary and non-discretionary accruals. Earnings 
persistence tests only investigate the impact on next 
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year earnings (t+1) but do not study the impact on 
earnings in year t+2 or t+3. For further study it is 
preferable to distinguish the behavior of accrual 
earnings management from real earnings manage-
ment in state-owned enterprises (BUMN) and non-
state-owned enterprises (non BUMN) or companies 
with family and non-family ownership, which 
would enrich the study. It would also interesting 
examine the effect of earnings management (both 
discretionary accruals and real activities manipula-
tion) on the cost of debt and firm value, and to ex-
amine the impact on long-term performance of the 
company. 
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